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INTRODUCI10N 
S
INCE the seminal case of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,' 
which extended the reach of the Fifth Amendment's Takings 
Clause to "regulatory takings,"2 scholars and courts alike have 
struggled to demarcate a principled boundary between com­
pensable and uncompensable regulatory takings.3 This effort has 
been so unsuccessful as to prompt a leading commentator to con­
clude that "[t]hroughout constitutional jurisprudence, only the 
right of privacy can compete seriously with takings law for the 
doctrine-in-most-desperate-need-of-a-principle prize. "4 Takings 
jurisprudence is replete with inconsistent distinctions that provide 
scant guidance for courts and policymakers.5 Indeed, in Penn Cen-
J 260 u.s. 393 (1922). 
2ld. at41S. 
3 See discussion infra Part I. 
4 Jed Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 Yale W. 1077, 1081 {1993). Rubenfeld is not alone. 
The list of critics of the Court's takings jurisprudence is long and impressive. See, e.g., 
Bruce A. Ackerman, Private Property and the Constitution 3 (1977) (calling takings 
jurisprudence "a set of confused judicial responses"); Raymond R. Coletta, Reciproc­
ity of Advantage and Regulatory Takings: Toward a New Theory of Takings 
Jurisprudence, 40 Am. U. L Rev. 297, 299-300 {1990) {calling takings jurisprudence a 
"chameleon of ad hoc decisions that has bred considerable confusion"); Gideon Kan­
ner, Hunting the Snark, Not the Quark: Has the U.S. Supreme Court Been 
Competent in Its Effort to Formulate Coherent Regulatory Takings Law?, 30 Urb. 
Law. 307, 308 {1998) ("The incoherence of the U.S. Supreme Court's output in this 
field has by now been demonstrated time and again by practitioners and academic 
commentators ad nauseam, and I refuse to add to the ongoing gratuitous slaughter of 
trees for the paper consumed in this frustrating and increasingly pointless enter­
prise."); Andrea L. Peterson, The Takings Clause: In Search of Underlying Principles 
Part I-A Critique of Current Takings Oause Doctrine, 77 Cal. L. Rev. 1299, 1304 
(1989) ("[I]t is difficult to imagine a body of case law in greater doctrinal and concep­
tual disarray."); Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue Is Still 
a Muddle, 57 S. Cal. L. Rev. 56, 61-62 (1984) ("By far the most intractable 
constitutional property issue is whether certain governmental actions 'take' 
property[;] . .. commentators propose test after test to define 'takings,' while courts 
continue to reach ad hoc determinations rather than principled resolutions."). 
5 Compare, e.g., Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 279-80 (1928) (finding no taking 
where a state regulation required owners to cut down red cedar trees infected with a 
virus that could kill apple trees, and noting that ''where the public interest is involved 
preferment of that interest over the property interest of the individual, to the extent 
even of its destruction, is one of the distinguishing characteristics of every exercise of 
the police power which affects property"), with Dep't of Agric. & Consumer Servs. v. 
Mid-Fla. Growers, 521 So. 2d 101 (Fla. 1988) (holding that full and just compensation 
was required when the state, pursuant to its police power, destroyed healthy trees), 
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 870 (1988); compare Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (holding that elimina-
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tral Transportation Co. v. New York City,6 the Supreme Court itself 
acknowledged its failure "to develop any 'set formula' for deter­
mining when 'justice and fairness' require that economic injuries 
caused by public action be compensated by the government," and 
dubbed takings cases "essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries. "7 
The regulatory takings conundrum has so bewitched academics 
that it has blinded them to the existence of a companion problem 
lying at the core of ordinary takings jurisprudence: the problem of 
externalities produced by takings, or, as we shall call them in this 
Essay, derivative takings. The problem of derivative takings is best 
illustrated by the case of United States v. Causby.8 In Causby, the 
plaintiffs-respondents claimed that the establishment of an air 
route above their houses worked a taking on their property. Writ­
ing for the Court, Justice William 0. Douglas ruled that the 
establishment of the air routes created an easement on the prop­
erty owners' air rights. However, he ruled that only those property 
owners whose houses lay directly below the air routes had a right to 
compensation under the Fifth Amendment. Justice Douglas denied 
compensation to the other property owners, who incurred essen­
tially the same harm as a result of the same government action, on 
the grounds that their property had not suffered a "physical inva­
sion."9 
The result in Causby is neither fair nor efficient_l0 The outcome 
is unfair because, from the point of view of the equally harmed 
property owners, the location of the lots relative to the flight routes 
is irrelevant and arbitrary. Harm to the property directly over-
tion of mining rights is a taking), with Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBene­
dictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987) (holding that elimination of mining rights is not a taking). 
6 438 u.s. 104 (1978). 
7 Id. at 124 (citing Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590,594 (1962)). 
8 328 u.s. 256 (1946). 
9ld. at260. 
10 The troubling result in Causby has been noted by others. Richard Epstein noted 
that Causby erred in treating the "entrance into protected airspace, [and] not the dis­
turbance it generated, [as] the gist of the government wrong." Richard A. Epstein, 
Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain 50 (1985). Frank 
Michelman more charitably attributed the "jarring" result in Causby to the need for 
administrable doctrine. Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Com­
ments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 
1165, 1170 (1967). William Fischel has simply labeled the rule of Causby "perplexing 
if not silly." William A. Fischel, Regulatory Takings: Law, Economics and Politics 96 
(1995). 
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flown-the physical taking-is fully compensated, while the same 
harm to the neighboring lot which lies one inch from the line of the 
air route-the derivative taking-remains fully uncompensated. 11 
The outcome is inefficient because it permits the government to 
extemaliie on private property owners a substantial part of the 
cost of a decision or policy that is acknowledged to be a taking, 
leading to inaccurate assessments of the cost effectiveness and de­
sirability of government policies. 
The derivative takings problem raised by Causby is present in 
almost every case of a physical taking. For example, every time the 
government condemns property to pave a road, it only compen­
sates the owners on whose property the road passes. Owners of 
abutting lots receive no compensation for the diminution in their 
properties' value, even though the diminution results directly from 
the government's exercise of the power of eminent domain. Even 
the Supreme Court-while maintaining the rule of Causby-has 
noted the anomaly created by the "gross disparity between the 
landowner whose premises are taken for a highway (who recovers 
in full} and the landowner whose property is reduced to 5% of its 
former value by the highway (who recovers nothing)."12 
We argue, contrary to accepted lore, that takings come in three 
forms, not two: physical takings, regulatory takings, and derivative 
takings. The three are analytically distinct. A physical taking occurs 
when the state seizes a property interest in order to put it to public 
use. In a regulatory taking, the state does not seize the property in­
terest, but regulates its use in a manner that unduly diminishes 
property values.13 A derivative taking is present whenever a taking 
diminishes the value of surrounding property. Derivative takings 
are a hybrid of their more familiar close cousins. They resemble 
regulatory takings in that they reduce the value of property with­
out physically appropriating it. Yet, they are distinct from 
regulatory takings in that they may arise as the result of a physical 
11 Saul Levmore bas pointed out that lower courts appear to have added a require­
ment of low altitude as well as direct overflight before compensation will be ordered. 
See cases cited in Saul Levmore, Takings, Torts, and Special Interests, 77 Va. L. Rev. 
1333,1352-53, 1353 n.29 (1991). 
u Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 n.8 {1992). The legal recourse 
available to these owners is in tort, namely in a nuisance action. We discuss the inade­
quacy of this option in Section ll.B.1, infra. 
13 See Mahon, 260 U.S. at 413 {1922). 
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taking. And, unlike its cousins, the derivative taking never appears 
alone; it must always be preceded by a physical or regulatory tak-
• 14 �g. . 
Our goal in this Essay is twofold. Descriptively, we bring to light 
the problem of derivative takings. We show that derivative takings 
pervade virtually every government action affecting property. Pre­
scriptively, we craft a workable mechanism for rectifying the 
problem of derivative takings. Compensating property owners for 
harms from derivative takings implicates two principal challenges: 
inadministrability and inadequate information. The first concern 
stems from the fear that the judicial system will collapse if a large 
number of new takings cases are admitted for consideration. The 
second concern derives from the fact that with derivative takings, 
as with any other externality, the government lacks sufficient in­
formation as to the exact identity of the harmed group and the 
magnitude of the harm. Self-assessment is capable of allaying both 
concerns. As we will show, a properly designed self-assessment 
mechanism can dramatically reduce the cost of compensating 
property owners. Furthermore, it can induce property owners to 
report truthfully the harms occasioned. on them by government ac­
tion. Moreover, we show that our proposed mechanism is, in 
principle, applicable to the two other types of takings-physical 
takings and regulatory takings-and, thus, it may serve as a unify­
ing principle in an area in desperate need of one. 
The best way to illustrate how self-assessment works is through a 
stylized example. Imagine that the state decides to pave a road. To 
this end, it takes four lots and compensates the owners of the lots 
taken. Assume that this action reduces the value of each of the four 
neighboring lots that now abut the road by $50,000. Under our 
proposed system, the four neighbors will report to the state both 
their belief that they suffered a derivative taking and the magni­
tude of the loss (in this case $50,000 each), and in principle, they 
will be entitled to this amount. 
To counter the proclivity of the assessors to exaggerate in their 
own favor by overstating the magnitude of their losses, the state 
14 As we discuss elsewhere, a derivative taking may also result from a physical or 
regulatory giving. See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Givings (March 1, 
2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Virginia Law Review Association). 
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must employ probabilistic audits and penalties of sufficient magni­
tude to deter false reporting. This can be achieved due to the 
unique informational basis the state has in this context. To slightly 
modify the previous example, assume now that each of the four 
homeowners exaggerates her damage by $10,000 (reporting 
$60,000 each, instead of $50,000). To deter exaggerations, the state 
audits and sues only one of the four homeowners. To make up for 
the fact that it has identified only one of the four exaggerating 
owners, the state can impose a false reporting penalty of three 
times the magnitude of the exaggeration.15 Concretely, in this case, 
the state will assess a penalty of $30,000 on the one audited home­
owner. The state will therefore grant her only $20,000 in 
compensation. Implemented correctly, this mechanism makes 
truthful reporting the profit-maximizing strategy for each of the 
homeowners, and ensures that the government does not overpay 
for its takings. 
Although the mechanism may sound unusual, it is not unprece­
dented; it resembles a procedure in use in the income tax arena.16 
Yet, there are some informational differences that make our 
mechanism more efficient. In the tax context, the state often lacks 
a benchmark against which to measure the truthfulness of self­
assessments. Here, by contrast, the derivative takings reports may 
be measured against two important baselines: the compensation 
paid to the homeowners whose property was physically taken and 
the reports of other neighbors claiming derivative takings. Fur­
thermore, because the state will know the enforcement rate and 
the exaggeration rate, it can calibrate the penalties to offset any in­
centive to overreport. . 
The outcomes generated by our mechanism increase both effi­
ciency and fairness. Forcing the state to bear the full cost of its 
actions helps ensure that the state uses its eminent domain power 
15 We discuss further the ideal magnitude of the penalty and the assumptions under­
lying this example in Part III.A, infra. 
16 �aul Levmore has suggested more widespread use of self-assessment mechanisms. 
See Saul Levmore, Self-Assessed Valuation Systems for Tort and Other Law, 68 Va. 
L. Rev. 771 (1982); discussion infra Part III; see also Peter F. Colwell, Privatization of 
Assessment, Zoning and Eminent Domain, ORER Letter (Off. Real Est. Res., U. 111. 
Urbana-Champaign), Spring 1990, at 1-7 (endorsing self-assessment for property 
taxes, takings and other property-related value assessments). 
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only when doing so enhances social utility.17 The full compensation 
afforded to owners guarantees efficient investment in property. In­
sofar as fairness is concerned, our system guarantees just 
compensation to all homeowners who suffer a harm as a result of 
government action, eliminating the risk that the public at large will 
benefit at the expense of few. Furthermore, the mechanism we 
propose reduces or eliminates two distortions characteristic of tak­
ings. First, it reduces the disparate impact of eminent domain on 
the poor, thus creating a desirable distributive effect. Roads and 
undesirable public facilities are usually built in poor areas because 
the value of property in such areas is lower. As a result, derivative 
takings are much more prevalent in poor neighborhoods.18 Our sys· 
tem remedies this problem by ensuring that the poor receive 
compensation for the burdens they are forced to bear. Second, our 
proposal offers the advantage of a dramatic reduction in admin­
istrative costs in compensating for takings. The fear of inadminis­
trability has had an important role in shaping takings doctrine and 
is responsible for many of the doctrine's distortions. Alleviating 
this concern can open the way to a more coherent, efficient, and 
just takings policy. 
We wish to emphasize at the outset that throughout this Essay 
we remain agnostic as to the definition of a compensable taking. 
Instead, we assume that once an action is already deemed a taking, 
the government should account for the full cost of its action to the 
extent that it is administratively feasible. In accordance with this 
assumption, we seek to expose the full range of costs occasioned by 
actions that are already recognized as takings and develop a supe­
rior administrative mechanism for compensation. 
In Part I, we briefly review the current state of takings jurispru­
dence. In Part II, we present our modified typology of takings 
instances. In this Part, we present the problem of derivative takings 
and we evaluate its effects on fairness and efficiency. In Part m, 
17 We discuss in greater detail below the question of whether the government should 
be treated as a rational wealth·maximizing economic actor. See infra note 53 and ac­
companying text. 
"'In a study of exercises of eminent domain in Chicago, Patricia Munch demon· 
strated that that the indigent (those with lower value property) were consistently 
undercompensated relative to the affluent (those with higher value property) due to 
the high cost of litigating appeals of government appraisals. See Patricia Munch, An 
Economic Analysis of Eminent Domain, 84 J. Pol. Econ. 473, 487-88 (1976). 
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we craft our solution to the problem of derivative takings-self­
assessment-and devise a mechanism that ensures truthful report­
ing. We conclude in Part IV by developing the possibility of using 
our self-assessment scheme in other areas of takings jurisprudence, 
especially in the context of regulatory takings. 
I. THE TAKINGS TRIANGLE 
As a formal matter, the takings conundrum involves nothing 
more than identifying at which apex of the eminent domain-tax­
police power triangle a government action lies. The Fifth 
Amendment to the Constitution demands that the government 
compensate property owners when it "takes" the property through 
its power of eminent domain.111 However, when the government 
''takes', through taxes, or reduces value by exercise of its police 
powers, it need not compensate.20 Yet, the label chosen by the gov­
ernment is not dispositive. When regulation-normally, a 
legitimate exercise of the police power-reduces property values 
too much, it ceases to be an exercise of the police power and be­
comes an exercise of the power of eminent domain-thus a 
compensable taking.21 For the formalist, compensable takings in all 
1' The Fifth Amendment only applies to the national government, but the Four­
teenth Amendment incorporates the Bill of Rights' protections (including the Takings 
Clause) against actions of state governments. See Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. 
v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226,241 (1897) (incorporating the right to just compensation into 
the Due Process Clause of Fourteenth Amendment). 
20see Penn Cent Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). The gov4 
ernment may also reduce value by committing a tort. However, it cannot be said that 
there is a government "power'' to commit torts. See discussion infra Section II.B.l. 
For an argument that the original understanding of the Takings Clause mandates that 
only physical appropriations be viewed as requiring compensation, see WilHam M. 
Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Political Process, 
95 Colum. L. Rev. 782 (1995). 
:ou See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). Justice Holmes identified 
those regulations that have become exercises of the power of eminent domain as 
regulations that have gone "too far." Holmes assumed, in accordance with constitu­
tional doctrine of his time, that such "excessive" regulations of property rights would 
set them afoul of the court's limitations on the exercise of the police power, founded 
in economic substantive due process or the Contracts Clause, and that the regulations 
could therefore be justified only with respect to the power of eminent domain. See 
Glen E. Summers, Private Property Without Lochner. Toward a Takings Jurispru­
dence Uncorrupted by Substantive Due Process, 142 U. Pa. L. Rev. 837, 846-54 
(1993}; cf. Robert Brauneis, "The Foundation of Our 'Regulatory Takings' Jurispru­
dence": The Myth and Meaning of Justice Holmes's Opinion in Pennsylvania Coal 
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cases are easily identified by stripping away the label and uncover­
ing the nature of the actual state power being exercised. 
But the formalist approach is deeply unsatisfying. To begin with, 
the categories are so vague as to settle nothing. How does one tell 
the difference between exercises of the police power, the taxing 
power, and the power of eminent domain? After all, once the court 
is willing to look beyond the label attached by the state, the court 
must rely on some substantive differences between the different 
powers that make them intrinsically and identifiably different. The 
mere label solves nothing. And more importantly, why ought the 
right to compensation turn on the nature of the exercised power? 
Why is an uncompensated diminution of value constitutionally of­
fensive when it results from an exercise of the power of eminent 
domain, but not when it results from the taxing or police powers? 
The difficulties in line drawing have been compounded in recent 
decades by the emergence of new understandings of property. 
First, as Cass Sunstein has noted in another context, the New Deal 
undid the notion of groperty rights as fixed objects in the constitu­
tional constellation. In the post-New Deal universe, property 
became a legal construct to be reengineered at will by the legisla­
ture. This made takings a far more nebulous subject; what might 
have previously seemed like a seizure of property could be justified 
in the post-New Deal era as a mere redefinition of property rights. 
Thus, where the nineteenth-century Supreme Court could view 
"harm prevention" as a definitively regulatory concept,23 the late 
twentieth-century Court saw it as simply another justification for 
redefining property rights that could, in the appropriate circum­
stances, be viewed as a seizure.2� 
Second, as Charles Reich established in his celebrated article 
The New Property,25 the vastly expanded role of government al­
tered traditional concepts of the source and nature of wealth and 
property. Administrative regulation became the source of vast 
wealth, or, in some cases, the solvent that wiped away an entire 
Co. v. Mahon, 106 Yale W. 613 (1996) (arguing that Mahon is best understood as an 
expression of Holmes's multifaceted theory of the constitutional protection of prop­
erty). 
21See Cass Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 Colum. L. Rev. 873 (1987). 
23 See, e.g., Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 664--69 {1887). 
2.1 See Lucas v. S.C Coastal Council, SOS U.S. 1003, 1022-26 {1992). 
25 Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 Yale L.J. 733 {1964). 
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class of property. With the police power becoming the dominant 
creator of wealth, the importance of traditional confiscation pro­
ceedings as means of extinguishing property rights shrank relative 
to the power of regulation. 
Third, and most importantly, the once-dominant notion of prop­
erty as a discrete thing has been replaced by an understanding that 
sees property as a bundle of almost infinitely divisible rights.26 As 
the concept of property has subdivided, the different government 
actions affecting property rights have come to be seen as differing 
only in degree and never in kind. With property now viewed as a 
bundle of sticks of rights, it is unclear how many sticks have to be 
removed before a taking occurs.27 
For the past quarter century, the judiciary has struggled unsuc­
cessfully with this new reality, failing to craft a coherent takings 
doctrine. In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City,'/! 
the Court explicitly raised its hands and established an ad hoc in­
quiry comprising three factors for identifying takings in actions that 
purport to be exercises of the police power: the owner's reasonable 
investment-backed expectations, the nature of the government ac­
tion, and the degree of diminution in property value.29 At the same 
time, the Court refused to let go of traditional identification 
schemes characteristic of the pre-New Deal era. Notwithstanding 
the Penn Central test, permanent physical invasions alone are tak:­
ings,30 prevention of noxious uses may block the finding of a 
26See Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 Yale L.J.1163, 
1189-94 {1999) ("Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon marks the beginning of the Court's 
dramatic shift away from thing-ownership • . .  toward the bundle metaphor • • . •  "), 
w See generally Ackerman, supra note 4, at 116-18 (discussing the difference be· 
tween the layman's view of property and the more complex reality of property as 
various collections of "property-bundles"). Much of the debate between Justices 
Holmes and Brandeis in Mahon turned on whether the state act bad removed an en­
tire estate. Compare Mahon, 260 U.S. at 414 (Justice Holmes noting that the state act 
"purports to abolish what is recognized in Pennsylvania as an estate in land"), with id. 
at 419 (Brandeis. J., dissenting) {"The rights of an owner as against the public are not 
mcreased by dividing the interests in his property into surface and subsoil!'). See also 
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S.104, 130 {1978) C"Taking• juris· 
prudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments and attempt to 
determine whether rights in a particular segment have been entirely abrogated."). 
28 438 U.S. at 130. 
:zg See id. at 124. 
30 See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419,426 {1982). 
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taking,:u and a complete wipeout of property value not ascribable 
to nuisance prevention is a per se taking.32 Arching over the entire 
scheme, the Court's new substantive economic due process ap­
proach requires a rational "nexus"" and/or "rough proportionality"34 
between the government action and its goal.35 
This confounding welter of cases represents only the Court's at­
tempt to patrol the line between eminent domain and police 
powers. The Court has never seriously addressed the relationship 
of the taxing power to either of these two powers, leaving most of 
the area of the takings triangle in the shadow of uncertainty. 
Coming to the aid of the courts, theoreticians have proposed a 
plethora of alternative litmus tests for the Takings Clause.36 The 
most extreme view is associated with Richard Epstein, who would 
see practically any government action that diminished property 
values-whether stemming from tax, eminent domain, or police 
powers-as a taking for which compensation is constitutionally 
mandated.37 At the other end, Louis Kaplow, similarly failing to 
identify any grounds for distinguishing compensable takings from 
other government actions diminishing property values, has ex­
pressed some doubt about the attractiveness of government 
compensation altogether.38 Kaplo�9 and Lawrence Blume and 
Jt See Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915). 
32 See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1028-29 (1992). 
» Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987). The Court required that 
the government action "'substantially advance' ... [a] 'legitimate state interest[]!" Id. 
at 834 (quoting Agins v. Tibuton, 447 U.S. 255.260 (1980)). 
34 Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374,391 (1994). 
S5 While the Court has not identified the rationality portion of its takings jurispru­
dence as "substantive due process," it is substantive due process that provides the 
pedigree and the likely doctrinal justification for requiring regulations to be under­
taken by means of the power of eminent domain rather than a police power. See City 
of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, 526 U.S. 687, 753 (1999) ( Souter, J., 
concuning in part and dissenting in part); supra note 21. 
36 There have also been more modest attempts to clean up the doctrine without nec­
essarily resorting to grand theory. See, e.g., Andrea L Peterson, The Takings Clause: 
In Search of Underlying Principles Part U-Takings As Intentional Deprivations of 
Property Without Moral Justification, 78 Cal. L. Rev. 53 (1990). 
'S1 See Epstein, supra note 10, at 35-36. Epstein also sees torts as giving rise to con­
stitutionally required compensation. 
38 See Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 
509, 531 (1986). 
39 See id. at 538-41. 
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Daniel Rubinfeld40 have suggested that privately supplied insur­
ance for government-induced diminution of property values might 
be pJ;eferable to a scheme of government-provided compensation; 
Blume and Rubinfeld concluded accordingly that compensation 
should mimic insurance and be available only where the owners 
are highly risk-averse and the losses large.41 
Other commentators have clustered around intermediate posi­
tions, most famously explained by Frank Michelman, who 
proposed that when a utilitarian calculus demonstrates the net 
positive·bene:fi.t of the government action, one might appropriately 
let the losses lay where they fall and refuse to pay compensation.42 
Michelman himself maintained some skepticism about the utilitar­
ian approach, and he insisted that, at the very least, one of the costs 
to be taken into account is the demoralization that may result from 
the feeling of having been victimized by a government taking.43 
Any number of additional theorists, most less squeamish about 
utilitarianism, have found themselves similarly attracted to inter­
mediate positions.44 
Yet a third group of theories focus on the government's pre­
taking motivation or post-taking use of the property. Joseph Sax 
has proposed requiring compensation whenever the government 
acts like an enterprise. On his view the government is required to 
pay compensation when it uses the property to provide goods and 
services, but not when it arbitrates private disputes-for instance, 
.co See Lawrence Blume & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings: An 
Economic Analysis, 72 Cal. L. Rev. 569 (1984) . 
.ct See id. at 572. 
4 See Michelman, supra note 10, at 1214-24 . 
.o Michelman recognized the potential unfairness of refusing compensation on utili� 
tarian grounds, even after demoralization costs are taken into account, and he 
presented a Rawlsian fairness approach as an alternative to his utilitarian approach, 
However, he viewed a purely fairness-based jurisprudence of the Takings Clause as 
practically unworkable. See id. at 1248-53. 
'"See, e.g., Levmore, supra note 11, at 1334 (suggesting that "[r]esponsibilities that 
private parties can impose on each other through the tort system, and thus without 
compensation, can similarly be imposed by the government without compensation"); 
Fischel, supra note 10, at 351-53 (arguing that compensable takings should be found 
where regulations diverge from social norms); Thomas J. Miceli & Kathleen Seger� 
son, Regulatory Takings: When Should Compensation Be Paid?, 23 J. Legal Stud. 
749,750 (1994) (adopting a straightforward utilitarian efficiency test). 
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by preventing noxious uses.45 Jed Rubenfeld's variation on Sax's 
test requires comyensation whenever the post-taking property is 
put to public use. 
Few of these theories attempt to do more than identify the dif­
ference between regulatory takings and noncompensable exercises 
of the police power. Saul Levmore is one of the few to note that 
"every theory of takings should explain or at least struggle with the 
question of why the power to tax-without compensation, of 
course-is not fundamentally inconsistent with the constitutional 
obligation to compensate condemnees";47 however, there is little 
serious work on the subject." 
II. THE EFFICIENCY AND FAIRNESS OF DERN ATIVE TAKINGS 
A. Derivative Takings and Compensation 
The various rationales discussed earlier can be lumped into two 
general categories: fairness-based justifications and efficiency­
based justifications.49 For the purpose of this Essay, we do not need 
to decide which of these sets of justifications is preferable. As we 
show, failure to compensate for derivative takings is at odds with 
both. 
Efficiency-based justifications focus on the concern that without 
compensation, the government will excessively exercise its eminent 
domain power. That is, government will take private property for 
societal use, even where doing so reduces net social welfare. Fair­
ness-based justifications are based on the idea that it is wrong to 
�see Joseph L Sax. Takings and the Police Power, 74 Yale LJ. 36, 62-63 (1964). 
Sax later recanted major parts of his theory. See Joseph L Sax, Takings, Private 
Property and Public Rights, 81 Yale L.J. 149 (1971). 
"'See Rubenfeld, supra note 4, at 1078-81 • 
.n Saul Levmore, Just Compensation and Just Politics, 22 Conn. L Rev. 285, 292 
(1990). Levmore seems to suggest that lack of compensation for taxes can be justified 
only where the taxes can be seen to work an average reciprocity of benefits . 
... Kaplow briefly suggested that taxes may be distinguished from compensable tak­
ings on the grounds that taxes are intended to alter distribution of wealth. See 
Kaplow, supra note 38, at 519. For a view that takings can legitimately be aimed at 
redistribution, see Hanoch Dagan, Takings and Distributive Justice, 85 Va. L. Rev. 
741, 767-68 (1999). 
�9 There are, of course, categorical/formal approaches to takings jurisprudence, such 
as those advanced by Sax, but even these must eventually be justified on either fair­
ness or efficiency grounds. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text. 
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"forc[e] some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all 
fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole. ,,50 
1. The Inefficiency of Uncompensated Derivative Takings 
Any taking generates positive and negative externalities.51 Every 
time the government takes property and puts it to public use, it 
creates winners and losers. Consider the example of a new high­
way. The construction of a new highway positively affects 
commuters and is likely to adversely affect people who reside in 
close proximity to the new road. The same is true whenever the 
government condemns private property to build a new airport, to 
establish a new factory, or to erect a new park. However, the num­
ber of people affected by various takings, as well as their respective 
gains and losses, varies from one case to another. From an effi­
ciency standpoint, a taking is justified only if the net gains to the 
winners outweigh the net costs to the losers; otherwise, the 
government action is inefficient. Indeed, the compensation re­
quirement in the Fifth Amendment guarantees just that. The 
compensation requirement forces the government to consider the 
cost of its action to private property owners-a cost it could other­
wise ignore. Yet, when the external effects of takings are not taken 
into account, we can never be sure that the actions of government 
promote economic efficiency.52 
so Annstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). 
51 An externality may be defined as "a cost or benefit that the volWltary actions of 
one or more people imposes or confers on a third party or parties without their con­
sent." Robert Cooter & Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics 45 (1988). The classic 
works on the subject are A.C. Pigou, The Economics of Welfare 172-203 (4th ed. 
1948) (proposing internalization of externalities by taxation), and R.H. Coase, The 
Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & Econ.1, 2,16-17 (1960) (positing that in the absence 
of transaction costs, internalization will occur through private negotiations without 
need for government intervention). 
n The same argument can be made about "givings"-the systematic failure of the 
government to take into account the windfalls resulting from government action. We 
discuss this problem in a different article. See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parcho­
movsky, supra note 14; see also Kaplow, supra note 38, at 567-68 (noting that benefits 
as well as costs may be discounted by decisionmakers). Inter alia, these difficulties 
arise as a result of the failure of the government to net out gains accruing to those 
from whom property is "taken." Under the no-longer applied "benefit-offset" princi­
ple, property owners claiming a taking would have their compensation reduced by the 
amount of benefit the taking conferred on the owners• remaining property. See 
Fischel, supra note 10, at 80-84. The problem of the distortions caused by the failure 
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A simple example can illustrate this fact. Assume that the city of 
Metropolis decides to construct a new airport. To do so, it will have 
to condemn 20 private lots, and pay the owners compensation in 
the amount of $1 million. The city estimates that the new airport 
will bestow an aggregate benefit of $2 million on travelers who re­
side within Metropolis' city limits. However, the noise from the 
flights will also diminish the value of the property in a radius of two 
miles from the airport by $1.5 million. It does not take much to see 
that the plan is inefficient: it effects a net loss of $0.5 dollars. Yet, 
current takings doctrine permits the city of Metropolis to operate 
under the fiscal illusion that its plan should go forward. 53 This is be­
cause the noise damage suffered by nearby property owners is not 
a taking, and thus the attendant cost of the taking to those owners 
does not require compensation under existing case law. If the ex­
ternal cost of building the airport falls on a relatively small group 
of residents, who, for some reason, lacks sufficient political clout to 
change the decision of the municipality, the plan is likely to go for­
ward despite the fact that it is inefficient. 
One can argue, of course, that the government will only take 
private property when the taking is efficient. The government will 
consider the aggregate costs and benefits of its actions independ­
ently of its duty to pay compensation. But this argument is, at best, 
Pollyannaish. When no compensation is required, one cannot rely 
on the government to act efficiently. The aftermath of Lucas v. 
South Carolina Coastal Councif4 provides a cogent example. 
to consider the losses to all parties in calculating the utility of an action has recently 
been reexamined in the context of tort. See Robert Cooter & Ariel Porat, Does Risk 
to Oneself Increase the Care Owed to Others? Law and Economics in Conflict, 29 J. 
Legal Stud. 19 (2000) (demonstrating that the failure of the Hand rule to take into ac­
count potential harm to tortfeasors has led to the adoption of suboptimal standards of 
care). 
53 In saying that the government is susceptible to fiscal illusion-that is, that when 
government does not have to bear the cost of its actions, it operates under the illusion 
that its actions are costless-we do not take the further step of arguing that the gov­
ernment acts like the rational wealth-maximizing individual prevalent in economists' 
models. It is not clear what government maximizes; indeed, Arrow's theorem predicts 
uncertainty. See Daniel A. Farber & PhilipP. Frickey, Law and Public Choice: A 
Critical Introduction 38-39 (1991); Daniel A. Farber, Economic Analysis and Just 
Compensation, 12 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ. 125, 129-32 (1992). Nevertheless, the empiri­
cal data can be said to demonstrate that government does operate under fiscal 
illusion. See Fischel, supra note 10, at 96-97; text accompanying notes 54-57 infra. 
S4 505 u.s. 1003 (1992). 
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In 1988, South Carolina enacted the Beachfront Management 
Act, 55 which prohibited development of certain coastal properties. 
As a result of the law, David Lucas was unable to develop two lots 
that he had purchased two years earlier for $487,500 each.56 After 
extended litigation, the Supreme Court upheld Lucas's claim that 
the legislation worked a taking, and that he was therefore entitled 
to compensation. 
Faced with a court order to compensate Lucas for the taking, 
South Carolina bought the lots from Lucas for $425,000 each," re­
pealed the preservation statute that had occasioned the lawsuit, 
and offered for sale the two lots it had just taken from Lucas. As­
tonishingly, South Carolina rejected an offer from Lucas's former 
neighbors to purchase one of the lots for $315,000 and preserve it 
undeveloped. Instead, the state sold the lots to a developer for 
$392,500 each. 58 The numbers reveal that the South Carolina gov­
ernment was content to require beachfront preservation at a cost 
of $487,500 per lot to Lucas (Lucas's purchase cost for the lots), 
but not at a cost of $77,500 per lot to itself (the difference between 
what the state would have received had it sold the lots to the pres­
ervationist neighbors, versus what it received when it sold the lots 
to the developer). This outcome suggests, at the very least, that 
government's cost-benefit analysis is affected by its duty to com­
pensate. 
More importantly for our purposes, the outcome of Lucas 
strongly suggests that the government will not, of its own initiative, 
compensate-or even take into account-property owners who are 
adversely affected by derivative takings. 
2. The Unfairness of Uncompensated Derivative Takings 
The fact that takings create winners and losers also raises con .. 
cerns about the equity of government action.59 In contrast to 
" S.C. Code Ann. § 48�39-250 to -360. (Law. Co-op. 1990). 
"'Lucas paid $975,000 for the two lots. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1006. 
57The state also paid for Lucas's legal costs, bringing the total settlement to $1 .5 
million. See H. Jane Lehman, Case Closed: Settlement Ends Property Rights Lawsuit, 
Chi. Trib., July 25,1993, at G3 . 
.ss See Fischel, supra note 1 0, at 61. 
59 Again, the same can be said for government actions resulting in windfalls. See su­
pra note 52. 
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efficiency-based concerns that focus on the welfare effects of gov­
ernment action, fairness-based concerns focus on how the cost of 
government action is distributed among the public. From a fairness 
vantage point, the just compensation requirement embodies the 
Kantian imperative that individuals be treated as ends and not as 
means. 60 Accordingly, even when a taking is efficient it should not 
disproportionately burden any individual member of society. 
The Takings Clause assures fairness by requiring that the state 
compensate individuals whose property would otherwise be sacri­
ficed for the greater good. But here, again, by failing to 
compensate for derivative takings, current takings doctrine violates 
the underlying fairness rationale. Under current doctrine, it turns 
out that certain individuals' property may be sacrificed for the 
greater good after all. Consider again the case of United States v. 
Causby.61 In Causby, the overflights occasioned a loss upon all of 
the owners in the neighborhood overflown by airplanes using the 
new flight routes. However, the only property owners to receive 
compensation were those whose property was directly beneath the 
new air routes. Other property owners were effectively forced to 
subsidize the new policy. Regardless of whether the establishment 
of the new air routes was efficient, it is difficult to contrive a fair­
ness principle to support the compensation of some, but not all, of 
the harmed property owners in Causby and similar cases. 
More importantly, and somewhat ironically in light of the gen­
eral rhetoric accompanying the takings debates, uncompensated 
derivative takings tend to severely disadvantage the poor and dis­
enfranchised. Absent the need to compensate, it is political power, 
rather than an economic calculus, which dictates the siting of 
takings accompanied by negative extemalities.62 While this phe­
nomenon has prompted debate in the new field of "environmental 
justice,''63 it has otherwise tended to escape the notice of takings 
scholars. Assume that the city of Metropolis needs to build a new 
power plant. Two sites are suitable for the project: the first one is 
• See Immanuel Kant, Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals 46 
(Thomas K. Abbott trans., Liberal Arts Press 1949) (1785). 
11 328 U.S. 256 (1946); see supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text. 
62 See Farber, supra note 53, at 129-31. 
61 See, e.g., Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing "Environmental Justice": The Distribu­
tional Effects of Environmental Protection, 87 Nw. U. L. Rev. 787 (1992). 
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in the middle of the most affluent neighborhood, and the second is 
in the middle of the most poor and neglected neighborhood. In the 
ordinary course of politics, Metropolis will choose the second op­
tion. 
Of course, even if derivative takings required compensation, it 
would still make sense for the government to condemn the cheap­
est property so as to minimize its financial liability. Empirical 
evidence indeed suggests that in real world takings, local and fed­
eral governments prefer to take property on the cheap.64 But if 
compensation for derivative takings is mandatory, those who are 
repeatedly forced to bear the burden of government takings-the 
poor-will not be made economically worse off by the government 
taking. 
B. The Inadequacy of Existing Theory and Doctrine 
Having established a prima facie case for compensating for de­
rivative takings, we must now consider whether there are any 
oveniding doctrinal or theoretical reasons for leaving this problem 
unattended. Three reasons seem particularly pertinent: nuisance 
law, the principle of reciprocity of advantage, and concerns for the 
cost and practicality of administering a compensation scheme for 
derivative takings. 
1. Nuisance Law 
The tort of nuisance entitles the users of land to compensation 
for damages arising from an unreasonable and substantial interfer­
ence with the use and enjoyment of Iand.65 Accordingly, one might 
argue that any property owner suffering from a derivative taking 
can find her remedy in nuisance law. 
As a preliminary matter, it is not self-evident that by placing de­
rivative takings in the nuisance box, the government would escape 
its constitutional duty to compensate. Indeed, Richard Epstein has 
controversially argued that all government torts are takings, for 
61 See sources cited supra note 53. 
65 See W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts §§ 87-88, at 
619-23, 626 (5th ed. 1984). 
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which the Takings Clause mandates compensation.66 But irrespec­
tive of whether Epstein is correct, compensation for damages in 
nuisance actions is not an adequate substitute for compensation for 
derivative takings. 
Nuisance--labeled by Prosser as a "legal garbage can"-is a 
highly imperfect remedy for damage to property.67 First, nuisance 
law is triggered only by unreasonable acts. The definition of rea­
sonableness in nuisance law has sparked substantial disagreement. 
Some courts have ruled that the reasonableness requirement goes 
to the level of interference.68 The Restatement,s view, however, is 
that reasonableness in the context of nuisance is identical to the 
reasonableness requirement in the context of negligence. Specifi­
cally, the Restatement instructs the court to determine whether 
"the gravity of the harm outweighs the utility of the actor's con­
duct. "69 Under this test, victims of derivative takings will not 
receive compensation if the government can show that, on the 
whole, a taking effected a net gain.70 
Second, nuisance law requires a plaintiff to prove substantial in­
terference with her use or enjoyment of land; interference that 
does not meet this standard is not actionable in nuisance. Although 
derivative takings may sometimes satisfy the substantiality re-
M See Epstein, supra note 10, at 46, 49. Epstein even identifies Causby as providing 
evidence that compensation for nuisances is constitutionally mandated. Like practi­
cally every aspect of Epstein's Takings, this idea has its detractors. See, e.g., Mark 
Kelman, Taking Takings Seriously: An Essay for Centrists, 74 Cal. L Rev. 1829 
(1986) (book review). 
67 William L. Prosser, Nuisance Without Fault, 20 Tex. L. Rev. 399, 410 (1942); see 
Keeton et al., supra note 65, § 86, at 616 (''There is perhaps no more impenetrable 
jungle in the entire law than that which surrounds the word 'nuisance.,). 
a See, e.g., Boomer v. Atl. Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970) (granting an 
injunction to the plaintiff landowners unless the defendant cement plant owner 
compensated the plaintiffs for the total economic loss to their property (present and 
future) caused by the defendant's operations, where total damage to the plaintiffs' 
properties was relatively small in comparison with the value of the defendant's opera­
tion); Jost v. Dairyland Power Coop. 172 N.W.2d 647 (Wis. 1969) (upholding the 
exclusion of evidence offered by the defendant to show that the utility of its power 
plant outweighed the gravity of the harm caused by the plaintiffs). 
18 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 826(a) (1977). 
70 For theorists who would compensate only where the costs of government action 
are outweighed by its benefits, this would not be a terribly disturbing result per se. 
See supra text accompanying notes 42-44. But it is unlikely that the cost-benefit 
analysis contemplated by nuisance would include all of the factors required by 
Michelman, such as demoralization costs. 
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quirement, they will often be too minor to support a nuisance 
claim.11 Importantly, though, the fact that the interference is insub­
stantial in each individual case does not mean that it is also 
insubstantial when all individual interferences are aggregated. Yet, 
nuisance law requires each individual plaintiff to have an action­
able claim. 
Third, nuisance law protects use and enjoyment of land. Deriva­
tive takings, on the other hand, affect the value of property,n an 
interest that in many cases differs from use and enjoyment. For ex­
ample, the paving of a new highway in proximity to a 
neighborhood often diminishes the value of all the properties in 
the neighborhood-even those that are not affected by the traffic. 
Yet, because nuisance law focuses only on use and enjoyment, it 
offers no protection against diminution in value, and property 
owners whose enjoyment and use have not been hampered will go 
uncompensated even if the value of their property has dropped 
substantially. 
Nuisance law does provide for damages occasioned by "public 
nuisances," that is, acts that interfere with general community in­
terests or the comfort of the public at large, even where the acts do 
not affect the use and enjoyment of land.73 Public nuisances are 
only actionable, however, if the plaintiff suffers special or unique 
harm.74 Thus, property owners whose property values have been 
diminished by an act that is not actionable as an ordinary, or pri­
vate, nuisance will not likely find their remedy in public nuisance 
either. 
For all these reasons, many cases of derivative takings, including 
severe ones, will fly under the nuisance radar screen. Nevertheless, 
one might ask why the government should be forced to pay for ex­
ternalities that are not actionable as torts while private property 
owners may create such externalities without having to compen­
sate.75 There are at least four reasons to reject such an approach. 
71 See Keeton et al., supra note 65, § 88, at 626-27. 
71 The property may be real or personal property. 
73 See Keeton et al., supra note 65, § 86, at 618. 
74 See Richard A. Epstein, Nuisance Law: Corrective Justice and Its Utilitarian Con­
straints, 8 J. Legal Stud. 49, 98-102 (1979) (discussing the distinction between private 
and public nuisance). 
75 Cf. Levmore, supra note 11, at 1334 (arguing that the government should be liable 
only where a private party would be liable). 
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First, the compensation to be paid for derivative takings is solely 
for externalities created by exercise of the power of eminent do­
main, a power generally unavailable to private actors. Thus, there 
is no private parallel to the derivative taking. Second, the gov­
ernment may regulate the creation of, and compensation for, ex­
ternalities among private parties. However, other than structural 
and political limitations imposed on the government, such as those 
imposed by the Takings Clause, the government cannot be regu­
lated by another party. Consequently, there is greater need to 
ensure compensation for government-created externalities than for 
privately created externalities. Third, the imposition of negative 
externalities on private individuals by other individuals is sharply 
limited by the existence of social norms, which sanction certain 
kinds of socially undesirable behavior.76 There is little reason to 
suppose that the government is similarly subject to the curbing ef­
fects of social norms.71 Finally, it would be more fair and efficient to 
respond to the disparity in treatment of externalities by curbing 
private owners' ability to impose negative externalities on their 
neighbors, rather than by allowing the government to impose simi­
lar negative externalities. 
2. Average Reciprocity of Advantage 
The concept of "average reciprocity of advantage', as a justifica­
tion for avoiding compensation was most prominently identified by 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. 
Mahon.18 Seeking to distinguish Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylva­
nia;19 Justice Holmes noted that some regulations, while diminish­
ing the value of property in one respect, could be said to benefit 
the property owner in another respect, such that no additional 
compensation is required. For example, a regulation forcing mining 
companies to leave intact pillars of coal in abandoned mines was 
excused from the compensation requirement because the regula-
'76 See Robert C. Ellickson, Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes 
208-10 (1991). 
77 a. Fischel, supra note 10, at 351-53 (arguing that compensable takings should be 
found where regulations diverge from social norms). 
78260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). Justice Holmes first coined the term "average reciprocity 
of advantage" in Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 260 U.S. 22, 30 (1922). 
79 232 u.s. 531 (1914). 
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tion benefited the mine owners by protecting the safety of their 
employees. 80 
It is not entirely clear how the concept of "advantage" is to be 
measured in order to determine whether a given regulation pro· 
duces average reciprocity. If the value of the advantage must be 
precisely equal to the loss, the question of whether there is average 
reciprocity of advantage (thereby defeating the need for finding a 
taking) becomes identical to the question of whether "just compen­
sation" has been paid. Whether referred to as an advantage or 
compensation, the benefit received by the property owner would 
only exempt the government from compensation if it were equal in 
magnitude to the loss created by the regulation. 
On the other hand, if the calculus is looser, as seemed to be the 
case in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 81 the 
principle of average reciprocity of advantage could become of· 
fensive to any notion of fairness or efficiency.82 Why should inade· 
quate compensation become satisfactory simply because it is in the 
form of an "advantage" rather than a cash payment? Assume that 
the paving of a new highway had the following effect on Sue, a 
nearby neighbor: It brought her one minute closer to the nearest 
interstate highway, and reduced the value of her property by 
$100,000. Under a broad interpretation of the average reciprocity 
of advantage principle, the quicker access to the interstate may 
constitute adequate compensation for Sue's loss. But this result 
clearly violates the spirit and the goals of the Fifth Amendment.83 
Even more importantly, it is difficult to see why the concept of 
average reciprocity of advantage should have any particular force 
with regard to derivative takings. Indeed, to the extent that fairness 
and efficiency require accurate evaluation of the losses imposed by 
80 See Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415. The related "benefit-offset" principle is discussed su­
pra at note 52. 
-
8l 438 u.s. 104, 130-31 (1978). 
a The Penn Central Court noted that, in theory, property owners could transfer the 
development rights blocked by the regulation in question to adjacent properties. The 
Court did not ask whether the transferable development rights were equal in value to 
the air rights that could no longer be exercised. See Penn Cent. Tramp. Co., 438 U.S. 
at 129-35. 
a A more congenial concept of the average reciprocity of interest test might see it as 
an attempt to incorporate the idea that the government action is actually better 
viewed as a tax. See supra note 48; infra text accompanying notes 127-28. 
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government action, it is all the more important that derivative tak­
ings be taken into account in order to determine whether a 
government action has, in fact, created an average reciprocity of 
advantage. 
Finally, the average reciprocity of advantage principle is irrele­
vant to many cases of derivative takings. For example, the new 
highway may not confer any benefit whatsoever on Sue and her 
neighbors if no on-ramp exists near their residences. There is no 
inherent reason to suppose that a property owner suffering from a 
derivative taking is more likely to receive an advantage than a 
property owner who suffered a physical or regulatory taking. 
The true usefulness of relying on average reciprocity of advan­
tage is its promise of savings in administrative costs. Relying upon 
the assumption of an average reciprocity of advantage absolves 
courts of the difficult task of measuring benefits and losses to de­
termine whether a given exercise of the power of eminent domain 
is efficient and fair. We therefore turn now to the question of ad­
ministrative costs. 
3. Practicality and Administrability 
Administrative costs have played a decisive role in defining the 
shape and scope of takings jurisprudence. Frank Michelman has 
explicitly attributed the "jarring outcomes" produced in cases such 
as Causby to the "felt need of courts for doctrinal principles which 
can be stated generally and yet incisively enough to conform visibly 
with the ideal of an impersonal justice. "84 Empirical data have con­
firmed the need for concern. One study showed that in highway 
projects, for every dollar issued in compensation for property 
seized by eminent domain, an additional twenty-three cents were 
expended in administrative costs. as Concern for inadministrability is 
responsible, in large part, for the reluctance to extend the Takings 
aause to regulatory takings. Once the floodgates open, so the ar­
gument goes, the legal system will drown. 86 This concern has also 
" Michelman, supra note 10, at 1170. 
85 See Joseph J. Cordes & Burton A. Weisbrod, When Government Programs Cre· 
ate Inequities: A Ouide to Compensation Policies, 4 J. Pol'y Analysis & Mgmt. 178, 
190 (1985). 
" See, e.g., Nell K. Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives: Choosing Institutions In Law, 
Economics & Public Policy 234-50 (1994). 
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led various theorists to argue that as long as a taking is, on the 
whole, efficient, there is no need for precise accounting among 
winners and losers, and the losses should lie where they fall.87 
While this concern certainly has merit, its power has been over­
stated. First, administrative efficiency is not the only goal 
promoted by the Takings Clause.88 A concern for the distribution 
of societal burdens may trump administrative efficiency considera­
tions, and as we showed, the problem of derivative takings 
disproportionately harms the poor. Second, in the remainder of 
this Essay, we will demonstrate that the inad.m.inistrability problem 
can be overcome through the self-assessment mechanism that we 
develop in the next part. 
III. TAKINGS AND SELF-ASSESSMENT 
Self-assessment is an important, yet largely unrecognized, 
mechanism of law enforcement.89 Potentially, self-assessment offers 
two advantages over administrative or judicial assessment mecha­
nisms: reduced administrative costs and superior information. Self­
assessment mechanisms place the burden of reporting and evaluat­
ing harms and benefits on the primary targets of these effects: the 
individuals who experience them. Yet, as Saul Levmore has noted, 
self-assessment remains a mostly untapped source.90 Aside from the 
instance of income tax reporting, self-assessment remains a suspect 
tool. The main source of this suspicion is the fear of strategic re­
porting; in the absence of an external check on the self-assess­
ment's veracity, individuals will have the incentive to overreport 
their entitlement to benefits and underreport their liabilities. 
Self-assessment is readily applicable to derivative takings. As in 
other contexts, however, the key to utilizing the self-assessment 
mechanism effectively in the realm of derivative takings is to craft 
an effective mechanism for combating strategic reporting. We pro­
pose a self-assessment mechanism that incorporates probabilistic 
auditing and weighted penalties. Our mechanism is modeled in 
r� See supra notes 43-45. 
811 See Michael A. Heller & James E. Krier, Deterrence and Distribution in the Law 
ofTakings, l12 Harv. L. Rev. 997, 998-1002 (1999). 
89 See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shaven, Optimal Law Enforcement with Self­
Reporting ofBehavior, 102 J. Pol. Econ. 583 {1994). 
llQ See Levmore, supra note 16, at 771. 
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part on the income tax enforcement apparatus91 and meets the need 
for low cost and accuracy. In addition, the auditing and penalty 
mechanism allays the concern of strategic reporting by providing 
optimal incentives to report truthfully. Finally, by ensuring the 
simplicity of the mechanism, we avoid the excessive externalization 
of administrative costs on private property owners, a difficulty that 
plagues the income tax reporting system. 
Our self-assessment model draws on the central insight of Gary 
Becker's pioneering model of law enforcement.91 Becker was the 
first to note the virtues of probabilistic enforcement. Working in 
the area of criminal law, he observed that perfect detection and 
punishment of all criminal violations, even if achievable, would be 
socially undesirable. Given the existence of enforcement costs, the 
more efficient solution, he suggested, is to enforce the law prob­
abilistically-that is, to prosecute only some violators while raising 
the penalties to compensate for the partial enforcement. Becker 
demonstrated that such probabilistic enforcement preserves ex 
ante deterrence at a lower cost than a system of full enforcement. 
Extending Becker's work, Louis Kaplow and Steven Shaven dem­
onstrated that optimal enforcement schemes with self-reporting are 
more efficient than ones without self-reporting, since self-reporting 
further reduces enforcement costs. 93 We show that with the neces­
sary adjustments, self-assessment and self-reporting can reduce 
transaction costs sufficiently to enable compensation of derivative 
takings. 
A. A Model of the Self-Assessment Mechanism 
In our proposal, any government exercise of the power of emi­
nent domain entitles affected property owners to file a self­
assessment report. In other words, the triggering event is either the 
commencement of condemnation proceedings or a finding of in-
91 See James J. Freeland et al., Fundamentals of Federal Income Taxation 962-85 
(11th ed. 2000) (surveying the self-assessment, auditing, and penalty procedures in the 
federal income tax apparatus); James Andreoni et al., Tax Compliance, 36 J. Econ. 
Literature 818 (1998). 
91 Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. Pol. Econ. 
169 (1968). 
93 See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 89, at 584-85. 
302 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 87:277 
verse condemnation. 94 Once the triggering event occurs, property 
owners claiming a derivative taking will be allowed one year to file 
their reports. In the report, property owners will have to specify 
only three items: the identity of the taking occasioning the loss, the 
base value of the property, and the magnitude of the loss. In the 
ordinary course of events, the government will compensate the 
property owner at the amount claimed in the report. However, a 
certain percentage of the reports will be audited, and if the auditor 
determines that the claim is exaggerated, the payment will be re­
duced by the amount of exaggeration and an additional penalty 
calibrated to optimize deterrence. Owners disagreeing with the au­
dit results will be entitled to appeal to a court of law. 
The key to the efficient operation of the reporting mechanism 
lies in setting the penalty amount so as to generate optimal deter­
rence, and to offset the cost of the exaggerations that occur despite 
the penalties." Specifically, the penalties discounted by the likeli­
hood of being audited must eliminate the inherent incentive to 
overreport, and must also compensate the government for the ex­
cessive amounts paid to exaggerating property owners whose 
reports were not audited. 
The optimal penalty is represented by the formula P = px = (1/a 
- l)x, where P is the penalty, p is the penalty multiplier (that is, the 
number by which the overreported amount is multiplied to arrive 
at the magnitude of the penalty), x is the overreported amount, and 
a is the probability of detection. This penalty ensures optimal de­
terrence, since it creates the maximum expected payoff for owners 
at a self-assessment with zero overreporting. 
" Unlike a condemnation proceeding, an inverse condemnation proceeding is not an 
administrative action that is initiated by the government under expUcit authority of 
the eminent domain power. Rather, to pursue an inverse condemnation claim, an ag­
grieved owner must bring a law suit alleging the uncompensated and unacknowledged 
exercise of eminent domain power. See Jesse Dukeminier & James E. Krier, Property 
1168 (4th ed. 1998). 
liS Exaggerations will occur despite the penalty because different property owners 
have different attitudes toward risk. Risk-seeking property owners will exaggerate 
their reports despite the risk of being penalized. 
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The payoff for any given exaggeration is determined by the for­
mula 
f(x) = (1 - a)(v + x) + a(v - P) 
where f(x) is the expected payoff for any given exaggeration x, v is 
the true value of the loss occasioned by the derivative taking, and 
all other variables are as described above. The maximum payoff is 
determined by the partial differential of f(x) with respect to x, at 
8f(x)l Ox =  1 - a(1 -p) = 0 
which is at p = 1/a - 1, or P = (1/a - l)x, as noted above. 
The penalty also ensures that the net government payout will be 
optimized since the total payout, G, will be represented by 
w 
G -I, [(1 - a) (x, + v1) + a  (v,- P1)] 1•1 
where w is the total number of property owners.96 Assuming that 
exaggerations are equally distributed across property owners, and 
given that the penalty is set at P = (1/a - 1)x, the total payout 
should be at G = wx + wv - awx - awv + awv + awx - wx, or simply 
G = wv, which is the total value of the property loss. Thus, the gov­
ernment payout, assuming a properly calibrated penalty, will equal 
the net loss to property owners. 
A simple numeric example may illustrate the mechanism. Imag­
ine that the city of Metropolis paves a new road. The city initiates 
condemnation proceedings against the owners whose property will 
be paved over, and ten owners of property abutting the new road 
file self-assessments. The ten abutting lots drop in value by $50,000 
each, from $250,000 to $200,000. However, each of the ten home­
owners exaggerates her damage by $10,000, reporting a loss of 
$60,000. Assume that the practice in the city of Metropolis is to au­
dit ten percent of the reports-in our case, one report out of the 
ten-and that the auditor immediately spots the exaggeration. To 
make up for the ten percent audit rate, Metropolis should impose a 
116 We assume, for simplicity's sake, that the average exaggeration is equally distrib­
uted across reporting property owners. 
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false reporting penalty of nine times the magnitude of the exag­
geration-in our example, a penalty of $90,000.97 
B. Enriching the Basic Model 
1. Assumptions Revisited 
The above illustration incorporates two simplifying assumptions. 
First, we assumed that audits are perfectly effective and completely 
random-that is, that the chance of one's exaggeration being de­
tected is identical to the percentage of the reports being audited. 
Second, we treat the exaggerations as being randomly distributed 
and of random magnitude across the entire population such that 
they may be averaged. Neither assumption is likely to obtain in re­
ality. As in the case of income tax oversight, audits may be 
triggered by suspicious elements in the reports such as unusually 
high reported property values. Exaggerations will vary in reference 
to expectations of avoiding detection as well as such factors as rela­
tive propensity for risk. 
None of this undermines the validity of our self-assessment 
mechanism. Rather, relaxing the simplifying assumptions rein­
forces the validity and reliability of our proposal. Selective auditing 
will only increase the likelihood of detecting overreporting. When 
auditors are free to select which report to audit, they will, no 
doubt, focus on the ones reporting a higher than average loss: any 
deviations from the average figure will immediately attract the eye 
of the auditor. Furthermore, and by contrast to income tax audits, 
in the case at hand, various external indicia put the auditor in an 
excellent informational position to detect exaggerations. Not only 
does the auditor know the reports of other neighbors, but she also 
knows the amount paid to neighboring homeowners whose prop­
erty was physically taken (in the eminent domain cases )98 and the 
valuation of the property for property tax purposes. For these rea­
sons, the percentage of exaggerated reports detected by targeted 
w In  this example, the likelihood of being audited is 0.1, so the penalty multiplier (p 
= 1/a -1) should be 1/0.1 - 1 = 9. The actual penalty (P = px) should be 9 x $10,000 = 
$90,000. 
98 Below, in Part IV, we propose extending the self-assessment mechanism to physi­
cal takings as well. If this proposal is adopted, the external validation of a judged 
condemnation value would no longer be available. 
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audits is likely to be higher than the percentage of exaggerated re­
ports detected in a random audit. This should more than offset the 
risk of being unable to detect an exaggeration in an audit. It is true, 
of course, that exaggerations will not be randomly distributed 
across the population-some people are innately more risk prone 
than others. But this fact does not, ex ante, skew the results in fa­
vor of those not audited. 99 
A more serious challenge to our self-assessment mechanism is 
that real estate appraisal is not a precise science. The data neces­
sary to evaluate property under standard appraisal methods, such 
as comparable sales, may not be available. Furthermore, even 
where data is readily available, appraisers may reasonably differ in 
their interpretation of the data. To accommodate this challenge, we 
propose that minor variations of up to five percent not be penal­
ized, although the government's appraisal would still control. The 
property owner would have to pay the amount assessed by the 
government, but no weighted penalty would be added. 
It is important, though, that the government not reveal its allow­
ance of a "de minimis" defense to penalty assessments, lest 
homeowners routinely add a standard five percent exaggeration to 
their self-assessments!00 In other words, we encourage the govern­
ment to maintain "acoustic separation" with respect to its leniency 
rate.101 
• For a general discussion of the effects on deterrence of relaxing the assumption of 
risk-neutrality, see A. Mitchell Polinsky, An. Introduction to Law and Economics 75-
86 (2d ed. 1989). The movement away from random audits to targeted audits may in­
troduce the complication of strategic reporting-a difficulty we do not address. 
100 When the leniency rate is known to property owners, slight overreportin.g impli­
cates very little risk. If not audited, overreporting would result in overcompensation. 
If caught, they will receive the true compensation they deserve. However, due to the 
inherent indeterminacy of real estate appraisal, homeowners are unlikely to take ad­
vantage of the full five percent grace. As with their entire reporting strategy, their 
decision to exploit the de minimis defense will depend on their propensity for risk. 
101 Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in 
Criminal Law, 97 Harv. L Rev. 625, 630 (1984) (explaining how the legal system, 
through selective transmission. of legal rules, can effectively separate "conduct rules" 
addressed to the public at large from "decision rules" addressed to officials who apply 
conduct rules). 
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2. Calibrating the Penalty 
Thus far we have set the penalty at what our formula establishes 
as the optimal deterrence level. Importantly, however, ours is one 
of those rare cases in which there is no concern about over­
deterrence. Should the government decide to assess penalties in 
excess of our suggested amount, it does not present a problem for 
our mechanism. Our formula only establishes the minimum penalty 
to be imposed. This is due to the fact that the ideal amount of over­
reporting is zero, and as penalties can only be assessed on 
exaggerations; the government has no way to subvert the mecha­
nism into a revenue raising measure. Raising the penalty amount 
will prompt assessors to report truthfully, which will lead, in equi­
librium, to zero revenues to the government.102 
To be sure, there will be cases in which the penalty will generate 
inadequate deterrence. The paradigm instance of underdeterrence 
is one in which the homeowner lacks the wherewithal to pay the 
assessed penalty. For instance, a homeowner whose house is mort­
gaged to its full value, and who lacks other assets, will not be 
deterred by the prospect of being penalized because the penalty 
cannot be collected. The homeowner may, therefore, be predis­
posed to overreport. To alleviate this problem, criminal sanctions 
must be available against those who deliberately overreport. 
While, at first glance, this measure may seem extreme, it is neces­
sary to prevent deliberate defrauding of the public, and indeed, it is 
widely accepted in the tax context. Property owners are entitled to 
just compensation, but not to plundering of the public fisc. The 
self-assessment mechanism that we propose enables the award of 
compensation to those whose political weakness allows them to be 
victimized by the government. It would be unjust and inefficient to 
allow fraudulent abuse of this mechanism. 100 
102 'This assumes that there is no fe-ar of government error in issuing assessments and 
that homeowners are confident that they can be indemnified in the event that they 
present a mistaken assessment based on a faulty appraisal. If these two assumptions 
are relaxed, overdeterrence may prevent some homeowners from presenting true re­
ports lest they be penalized. 
tGJ Obviously, some good faith defense must be available. It would be morally repre­
hensible to jail someone simply because she lacked assets with which to pay a fine. It 
is important to realize, however, that all deterrence-based models have no applicabil­
ity to individuals who make innocent mistakes that cannot be prevented with greater 
caution. Furthermore, property owners who overreport on account of the negligence 
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3. Collusion 
Another refinement must be added to our model to meet the po­
tential threat of property owners colluding to misrepresent the 
value of their assets. For example, homeowners located near a po­
tential highway may decide to collectively overreport the noise 
damage, hoping that the similarity of reported values will shield the 
exaggeration from audit. It is important to note at the outset that 
such collusive strategy is highly unlikely. First, as is the case with 
any collusion, each colluder has a strong incentive to defect.104 In 
the present context, each reporter can increase her expected payoff 
by exaggerating marginally less than her neighbors. Second, the 
possibility of collusive behavior is further restricted by the fact that 
auditors can examine real estate property tax assessments and 
compare them with the self-assessed reports. Nevertheless, to fur­
ther reduce the likelihood of collusive false reporting, we 
recommend the imposition of joint and several liability on collud­
ing homeowners. This would enable the government to collect the 
debts of colluders who lack the financial means to pay them from 
other, wealthier, colluders, thereby increasing the deterrent effect 
on each individual homeowner. 
C. The Insurance Alternative 
Various scholars have expressed the view that private insurance 
may be superior to government compensation in effecting efficient 
allocation of resources.105 This view emphasizes the effectiveness of 
insurance in causing insured homeowners to consider the social 
cost of their decisions. Assume, for example, that a developer must 
of the appraisers they hired should have a cause of action against those appraisers in 
tort. This chosen action might provide an asset that can be used to satisfy a fine. 
101 Collusive agreements among property owners, like any other cartel, are character­
ized by a prisoner's dilemma payoff matrix and thus provide conspirators with a strong 
incentive to defect. While cooperation produces the highest aggregate payoff, defection 
increases the private payoff of each individual actor. For a more in depth discussion of 
the problem of cartelization, see Andrew R. Dick, When Axe Cartels Stable Contracts?, 
39 J.L. & Econ. 241 (1996) (analyzing the conditions under which cartels are stable). A1s 
a general rule, it is widely accepted that collusion is less likely to succeed when the 
number of colluders is large. See George A. Hay & Daniel Kelley, An Empirical Survey 
of Price FIXing Conspiracies, 17 J.L. & Econ. 13, 14 (1974). 
105 See Blume & Rubinfeld, supra note 40, at 567-69; Kaplow, supra note 38, at 
538-41. 
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decide whether to construct a hotel or a camping site in an area 
susceptible to flooding.106 Building the hotel guarantees the devel­
oper a higher payoff, but at the same time imposes on society the 
cost of compensating the developer in the case of flood. When the 
societal cost element is taken into account, building the camping 
site is actually the better option. However, since she is guaranteed 
compensation, our developer will opt to build the hotel. Thus, the 
Takings Oause creates an incentive for property owners to engage 
in excessively risky projects and spread the cost of the risk on soci­
ety as a whole. Insurance, it is suggested, can overcome this 
problem,X07 and, more importantly for our purpose, insurance can 
compensate property owners for any loss caused by a derivative 
taking without creating a need for government compensation. 
Aside from the Constitution's specific dictate of government­
provided compensation, and the observable fact that the market 
has not yet produced private takings insurance, 108 there are a num­
ber of prudential reasons to reject the insurance alternative. First, 
as Thomas Miceli has argued, the incentive analysis underlying the 
argument for insurance may be in error. Once one assumes both 
that the government takes into account the cost of compensation in 
its decision to take and that a property owner takes into account 
the likelihood of a taking in her decision to develop, owners will 
move toward optimal levels of investment. Owners will fear that if 
they overdevelop their property, they will deter a government tak­
ing and be left bearing the loss of the needless development.109 
Second, William Fischel and Perry Shapiro have observed that 
the insurance approach rests upon another faulty assumption, in 
that it relies upon an outmoded "Pigouvian" notion of the govern-
106 This example is a simplified version of the example discussed by WiUiam Fischel 
and Peny Shapiro in Takings, Insurance, and Michelman: Comments on Economic 
Interpretations of "Just Compensation" Law, 17 J. Legal Stud. 269, 271-76 {1988). 
107 It is worth noting that the discussion of insurance against takings focuses primar· 
ily on the threat of regulatory takings. It is not obvious that all the arguments for and 
against insurance are directly applicable in the context of derivative takings. A full 
exploration of this issue is beyond the ken of this Essay. 
1flll Others commenting on the lack of privately supplied insurance include Blume & 
Rubinfeld, supra note 40, at 569. 
1DP See Thomas J. Miceli, Compensation for the Taking of Land Under Eminent 
Domain, 147 J. Institutional & Theoretical Econ. 354, 358-59 (1991). 
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ment.110 This view posits that the government always behaves effi­
ciently to promote public welfare. Consequently, no external 
checks on the government are necessary. However, modem public 
choice theory rejects this unrealistic view of govemment111 and 
cases such as Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council112 provide 
ample evidence of the failures of the Pigouvian view.113 In light of 
the modem view of government, it is not enough to provide insur­
ance-based compensation to private owners. It is also necessary to 
demand government payment in order to deter inefficient govern­
ment action. 
Third, in addition to their failure to satisfy the efficiency con­
cerns of the Takings Clause, insurance schemes fail to fully answer 
fairness concerns as well. The availability of private insurance does 
not take into account the demoralization costs identified by 
Miche1man.114 On this view, when the government calculates 
whether compensation is constitutionally warranted, it must con­
sider the possible negative effects on morale occasioned on 
individuals who feel unjustly victimized. As Fischel and Shapiro 
write, the demoralizing effects of takings occur at the point in time 
that individuals are made aware that their wealth is being taken 
away, not at the point when the taking actually occurs. Thus, the 
fact that property owners would be forced to purchase insurance 
would itself create demoralization costs that would not be fully 
compensated.115 The problem would be particularly exacerbated 
were a particular class of property owners-the indigent-required 
to pay higher insurance premiums due to their greater vulnerability 
to government takings. 
Fourth, establishing a system of private insurance introduces the 
risk of insurance companies improperly influencing government 
policy. This is a particular manifestation of the moral hazard prob-
uo Fischel & Shapiro, supra note 106, at 276. 
111 See Farber & Frickey, supra note 53, at 12-62. 
Ill sos u.s. 1003 (1992). 
nl See supra Section U.A.1. 
u• See Michelman, supra note 10, at 1215. 
115 See Fischel & Shapiro, supra note 106, at 2B7. The authors conclude that the "ex­
istence of insurance • . .  is no more an argument for legalizing uncompensated takings 
than it is for legalizing the theft of watches." Id. 
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lem.116 Insurance companies who stand to lose from certain takings 
might exert improper influence on governmental decisions, by 
means of political contributions or bribes, in order to increase their 
revenues or minimize their losses. Of course, such influence is al­
ready possible without insurance, which is why, as we noted earlier, 
the burden of government takings tends to fall upon the poorest 
and least politically powerful. However, the aggregation of prop­
erty claims in the hands of private insurers will increase their 
ability to influence the political process. 
Fifth, a takings insurance scheme is vulnerable to adverse selec­
tion. As Robert Ellickson has pointed out, public officials and land 
developers may inform property owners of pending plans that 
might affect the owners, which would prompt them to buy insur­
ance in order to neutralize political opposition to the projects.117 As 
a result, insurance companies will not be able to adequately diver­
sify away the costs of selling takings insurance, and the insurance 
mechanism will collapse. This is the obverse of the previous prob­
lem, again reflecting the fact that the government behaves 
differently than other actors and that the interests of politicians or 
government managers may lead to a decision that would not be 
reached if both costs and benefits were directly incorporated into 
government budgets. 
At the end of the day, then, private insurance is not an adequate 
substitute for government compensation for derivative takings. 
IV. TOWARD UNIFYING PRINCIPLES 
We have, thus far, introduced a new form of compensable tak­
ing-the derivative taking-and suggested a self-assessment 
mechanism for administering the compensation. Yet, nothing in 
our self-assessment mechanism limits it to derivative takings. The 
introduction of self-assessment can go a long way towards address-
116 Generally, moral hazard is a concept associated with the tendency of the insured 
to take too many risks in response to the knowledge that adverse results are indemni­
fied by insurance. See, e.g., Polinsky, supra note 99, at 54-55. Interestingly, Blume 
and Rubinfeld believe that insurance creates a very different moral hazard. namely, 
that property owners will become indifferent to government takings and there will be 
a lack of necessary lobbying. See Blume & Rubinfeld, supra note 40, at 597-98. 
117 See Fischel & Shapiro, supra note 106, at 286 (citing a letter written to the au­
thors by Ellickson). 
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ing many of the shortcomings of takings doctrine. In this Part, we 
show that our proposed self-assessment mechanism may be readily 
extended to physical and regulatory takings. Furthermore, we sug­
gest the utilization of the concept of derivative takings and the 
mechanism of self-assessment to make sense of takings doctrine by 
defining which takings should be compensable. We conclude this 
Part by delineating the scope of self-assessment and defining its 
boundaries. 
A. Physical and Regulatory Takings 
Not only is our proposed method of self-assessment readily ap­
plicable to physical takings, but it also improves upon the existing 
system by reducing the cost of administering compensation. Allow­
ing property owners to assess and report the losses occasioned 
upon them by physical takings will result in compensation awards 
no less accurate than those allowed under the existing court-based 
system, but at a substantially reduced cost. The current compensa­
tion mechanism relies on judicial determination of compensation 
awards, and consequently, the grant of compensation is often pre­
ceded by extended litigation.118 This process imposes a considerable 
cost on property owners and unnecessarily burdens the judiciary. 
The implementation of our proposed self-assessment mechanism 
could dramatically decrease these costs. Rather than litigating all 
cases that involve disagreement as to the appropriate compensa­
tion, the government could allow property owners to report their 
losses, could audit a certain percentage of the reports, and then pe­
nalize overreports by using our formula. In fact, if the government 
118 See sources cited supra note 53. See also Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 
1003, 1006 (1992) (reviewing the extensive history of the case from its beginnings in 
1998 up until the Supreme Court granted certiorari); Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 
94, at 1209 (reviewing the complicated aftermath of the Supreme's Court's decision in 
Lucas that the government regulation was a taking); see also Loretto v. Teleprompter 
Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 421 (1982) (holding that a permanent physical 
occupation of property is a taking). On remand, the New York Court of Appeals up­
held the validity of the statutory provisions that authorized the Commission on Cable 
Television to determine adequate compensation for homeowners harmed by the legis­
lation. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 446 N.E.2d 428 (N.Y. 
1983). Following this ruling, the Commission concluded that the one dollar compensa­
tion award was sufficient since the installation of cable television usually increases the 
value of the property. See Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 94, at 1137. 
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calibrates the penalties correctly, very few incidents of overreport­
ing-and hence, potential litigation-should be expected. 
Removing the obstacle of administrability, we submit, is also the 
key to a more coherent and well-defined regulatory takings doc­
trine. We believe that the obscurity surrounding the compen­
sability of regulatory takings is due in large part to the fear of 
courts and commentators of the dire administrative consequences 
that would befall us if the Takings Clause extended to cover all 
compensatory· takings. While this concern is warranted, the analy­
sis that underlies it fails to take into account the possibility of 
crafting a superior administrative mechanism to address the con­
cern. Self-assessment provides such an improved mechanism. The 
adoption of our proposal would require court intervention only in 
a tiny percentage of the cases-those cases where an audited 
owner decides to appeal a finding of overreporting. If, for instance, 
10% of reports were audited, 50% of all audited reports revealed 
exaggeration sufficient to warrant a penalty, and 50% of all penal­
ties were appealed in court, only 2.5% of all reports would require 
the courts' intervention. 
With concerns for inadministrability out of the way, policymak­
ers could revisit and revise regulatory takings to take advantage of 
the new possibility frontiers. Current regulatory takings doctrine 
offers only three guideposts to the public. The first is that a sub­
stantial diminution in value is a compensable taking. 119 The 
second-a rather trivial derivative of the first-is that a complete 
wipeout of value amounts to a substantial diminution.120 The third 
is a relic of a previous era, which posits that elimination of a nox­
ious use is never a taking.121 
The Court's current ad hoc test for substantial diminution has 
proven nearly impossible to administer-in no small part because, 
absent a total wipeout, there is no way to know whether the gov­
ernment has gone too far. But with widespread information on 
property losses provided by self-assessment reports, policymakers 
could fashion per se rules for substantial diminution. For example, 
1111 See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922). 
120 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029. 
121 See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 470 (1987); 
Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 411 (1915). 
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courts may set a rule that any diminution in excess of 25% percent 
effects a compensable taking.122 
Alternatively, it is possible to devise a more sophisticated as­
sessment mechanism to examine more precisely the harms and 
benefits that are produced by regulation and alleged to be a taking. 
Current regulatory takings doctrine fails to incorporate adequately 
one of the primary justifications for uncompensated regulations­
the regulations' ability to prevent property owners from externaliz­
ing on the public costs associated with their property. A new 
assessment mechanism for alleged regulatory takings could incor­
porate all the elements of our self -assessment mechanism for 
derivative takings but also reduce a property owner's potential re­
covery by the value of the negative externalities prevented by the 
regulation.123 Such a mechanism would provide a more accurate 
calculus of the efficacy of the regulation and would also produce 
fairer results than any of the current doctrines. 
Policymakers might even take the bold step of eschewing alto­
gether impracticable tests such as substantial diminution and 
hopeless debates about definitions of property.124 Instead, they 
could rely on the limits of administrability to determine what is a 
compensable regulatory taking. Such a pragmatic approach may be 
the only workable solution to the regulatory takings challenge. 
This approach requ4"es, however, a period of experimentation dur­
ing which empirical data will be gathered on the costs of processing 
and settling self-assessment claims. 
122 Naturally, the relevant percentage may be higher or lower depending on one's 
view of what constitutes substantial diminution. Of course, any number may be at­
tacked as being arbitrary, which should tell us something about the usefulness of the 
substantial diminution test. 
1» In a related vein, Kaplow and Shavell proposed a self-reporting mechanism that 
deals exclusively with the problem of private externalities. In their scheme, harm­
causing individuals will be induced to self report their misdeeds in exchange for a 
somewhat lower penalty than the one expected if the government detects the wrong­
doing (the legal penalty multiplied by the probability of punishment). See Kaplow & 
Shaven, supra note 89, at 587-90. Admittedly, measurement of such externalities, ei­
ther in our scheme or in Kaplow and Shavell's, presents logistical problems far in 
excess of those discussed in our Essay. 
D4 For a review of the different interpretations of the notion of property, see Laura S. 
Underkoffler, On Property: An Essay, 100 Yale L.J. 127, 130-42 (1990). 
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The use of self-assessment can also answer the call for a de 
minimis exception in takings law.%25 As Saul Levmore has noted, 
self-assessment does not completely do away with administrative 
costs-to some extent, it merely shifts them to private property 
owners.126 And while shifting the costs to the party who can most 
efficiently handle them reduces administrative costs, preparing 
self-assessment reports will not be costless. Thus, placing the cost 
of assessment on the property owners will necessarily eliminate in­
substantial claims. No owner will incur the cost of preparing a 
report if this cost exceeds the expected compensation. 
We fully understand the need to allow the government to func­
tion. Accordingly, we do not suggest that any government action 
that adversely impacts property is by definition a taking; we remain 
agnostic on this debate. We do submit, however, that the same cri­
terion for compensation should apply to all three types of 
takings-physical, regulatory, and derivative. It is senseless and un­
justifiable that a diminution of one dollar due to a physical taking 
is compensable per se, while a diminution of $100,000 resulting 
from a derivative or regulatory taking can be effected with impu­
nity. The source of the harm and the harm's effect on property 
owners are the same, irrespective of classifications. By dramatically 
reducing administrative costs, our self-assessment mechanism pre­
sents the government with a unique opportunity to overhaul 
takings jurisprudence and establish a uniform compensation crite­
rion for all types of takings. Doing so will improve not only fairness 
and efficiency, but also the mood of millions of property owners, 
lawyers, and law students. 
B. Taxes and Takings 
As we noted in Part I of this Essay, the taxing power remains the 
neglected comer of the takings triangle. While it is universally ac­
knowledged-as it must be-that the government may tax 
property, theoreticians have rarely explored the notion that dimi-
us See, e.g., Heller & Krier, supra note 88, at 1008-09 (calling for the introduction of a 
"de minimis" exception into takings doctrine). 
126 See Levmore, supra note 16, at 812. In addition to the cost of appraising proper­
ties, the auditing mechanism will generate costs that may have to be met by increasing 
the magnitude of penalties. 
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nutions of property value in the name of the police power or emi­
nent domain could be considered noncompensable taxes.127 In a 
rare exception, Carol Rose has justified the concept of public nui­
sance-in which only those who have suffered special damage can 
get redress against acts that interfere with community interests or 
public comfort-on the grounds of in-kind taxation.128 But few have 
systematically explored the idea that when the burden of a gov­
ernment action falls on a sufficiently broad public in roughly equal 
proportions, the action is better characterized as a tax than as a 
taking or a regulation. 
We do not offer an unqualified endorsement of this concept of 
the taxing comer of the takings triangle. At least a colorable argu­
ment exists that when payment can only be made with particular 
property rather than a common means of exchange, the govern­
ment action is a taking and not a tax. One might also argue that no 
government action should be considered a tax unless it is primarily 
concerned with the raising of revenue. Nevertheless, to the extent 
that policymakers wish to adopt this concept of the taxing-takings 
relationship, the information provided by widespread self­
reporting could be critical. For example, if a government zoning 
regulation uniformly reduces property values in an entire county 
by ten percent, it may make more sense to consider the action a 
"zoning tax" than a regulatory taking. Indeed, the action is the 
equivalent of a ten percent property tax. Self-assessment reports 
would provide the information necessary to discern the true nature 
of government action. Specifically, the reports would indicate the 
size of the population burdened by the government action, and the 
distribution of the burden across the population.1zt 
127 In one of Takings' most controversial passages, Epstein intimated that taxation 
aimed at redistribution is, in fact, a taking. Epstein, supra note 10, at 99-100, 283-305. 
He later disavowed this position. See Richard A. Epstein, Property. Speech, and the 
Politics of Distrust, 59 U. Chi. L Rev. 41, 68-69, 87-88 (1992). 
m See Carol M. Rose, A Dozen Propositions on Private Property, Public Rights, 
and the New Takings Legislation, 53 Wash. & Lee L Rev. 265, 278 {1996). 
129 Indeed, several commentators have suggested that compensation should depend 
on whether the government action singles out a particular group. See Heller & Krier, 
supra note 88, at 1008 (suggesting that absent evidence that a particular group was sin­
gled out by the government, compensation should not be rendered for "small" takings); 
Levmore, supra note 11, at 1344-47 (asserting that compensation for overflights 
rightly depends, in practice, on whether owners have been singled out). 
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C. Self-Assessment: Not a Panacea 
Obviously, self-assessment is not an elixir. As any other mecha­
nism, our self-assessment mechanism has inherent limitations. 
First, our proposal cannot accommodate idiosyncratic tastes. 130 In­
dividuals who assign unique value to their property will be 
systematically undercompensated, as they are now .131 It must be 
borne in mind, however, that such undercompensation is inherent 
in any regime that permits forced sales at market prices. Although 
our scheme does not compensate owners for their loss of idiosyn­
cratic value, neither does the compensation mechanism currently in 
place. Notably, we do not suggest increasing the power of the gov­
ernment to force sales, something that might introduce a new 
source of unfairness, as well as create uncompensated demoraliza­
tion costs. 
Second, while our scheme substantially reduces administrative 
costs, it does not completely eliminate them. As we noted, in part, 
self-administration merely shifts administrative costs, albeit re­
duced costs, to property owners seeking compensation.•:n Thus, 
under our scheme, administrative costs remain a distorting factor 
and a source of inadequate compensation, at least at the margin. 
Moreover, the fact that property owners bear administrative costs, 
rather than the government, may induce policymakers to create 
unduly cumbersome record-keeping requirements and compensa­
tion structures/" Administration, like any other government 
function, is subject to fiscal illusion, and if creating administrative 
130 See Levmore, supra note 16, at 780-82. 
w See Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 94, at 1121-23; Thomas J. Miceli, Economics 
of the Law: Torts, Contracts, Property, Litigation 116 (1997): see also Coniston Corp. 
v. Vill. of Hoffman Estates, 844 F.2d 461, 464 (7th C'u. 1988) ("Compensation [for 
takings] in the constitutional sense is [] not full compensation, for market value is not 
the value that every owner of property attaches to his property but merely the value 
that the marginal owner attaches to his property. Many owners are 'intramarginal: 
meaning that because of relocation costs, sentimental attachments, or the special suit­
ability of the property for their particular (perhaps idiosyncratic) needs, they value 
their property at more than its market value (i.e., it is not 'for sale')."). 
�»The fact that taxation also has administrative costs means that additional com­
pensation payments will create a certain additional level of deadweight loss. See 
Fischel, supra note 10, at 146. These are additional administrative costs that owners 
will have to bear. 
m The income tax self-assessment system provides a none-too-encouraging exam­
ple. 
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burdens is costless for the government, it may be tempted to over­
regulate. Our self-assessment mechanism does not solve this 
problem. Unfortunately, the world without administrative costs is 
rarely found outside of economics journals, and placing administra­
tive burdens on those who can most cheaply bear them is the best 
that can be done in many circumstances. 
CONCLUSION 
In this Essay, we have uncovered and analyzed a previously un­
appreciated dimension of the perennially troubling takings 
jurisprudence-the adverse impact of government takings on 
neighboring third parties. We showed that virtually every exercise 
of the power of takings generates externalities-derivative tak­
ings-that have largely evaded takings scholars. Furthermore, we 
demonstrated that a takings system that fails to account for deriva­
tive takings is neither efficient nor fair. To remedy this problem, 
we constructed a self-assessment mechanism that incentivizes 
property owners to report truthfully the losses they suffer as a re­
sult of government takings. We accomplished this by basing our 
mechanism on the principle of probabilistic enforcement accom­
panied by weighted penalties for exaggerations. By lowering the 
administrative cost of compensation, our self-assessment mecha­
nism enables the compensation of currently uncompensated 
property owners. Simultaneously, it enhances economic efficiency, 
because it forces the government to fully internalize the cost of its 
actions. 
We also showed that the utilization of our self-assessment 
mechanism could illuminate and improve many of the pitfalls of 
existing .takings doctrine. Our self-assessment mechanism may be 
used to compensate victims of physical takings and perform this 
function at a much lower cost than the judicial mechanism cur­
rently in place. Its utilization in the context of regulatory takings 
offers the opportunity to reduce dramatically the cost of adminis­
tering claims. This may, in turn, prompt policymakers finally to set 
a clear rule as to when regulation "goes too far" and becomes an 
exercise of the power of eminent domain. Finally, the information 
garnered from the self-assessment report may enable us to distin­
guish between uses of the taxation power that legitimately go 
uncompensated and takings that demand compensation. We sub-
• 
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mit that the aggregation of these effects would result in a better 
and fairer use of the takings power and would begin the process of 
injecting coherence into a desperately confused area of the law . 
